\u3cem\u3eAmbiguous Commitments and Uncertain Policies: The Truman Doctrine in Greece, 1947-1952\u3c/em\u3e, by Judith S. Jeffrey by Augustinos, Gerasimos
University of South Carolina
Scholar Commons
Faculty Publications History, Department of
10-1-2001
Ambiguous Commitments and Uncertain Policies: The
Truman Doctrine in Greece, 1947-1952, by Judith S.
Jeffrey
Gerasimos Augustinos
University of South Carolina - Columbia, augustg@mailbox.sc.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/hist_facpub
Part of the History Commons
This Book Review is brought to you by the History, Department of at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Publications by
an authorized administrator of Scholar Commons. For more information, please contact dillarda@mailbox.sc.edu.
Publication Info
Published in American Historical Review, Volume 106, Issue 4, 2001, pages 1329-1330.
http://www.indiana.edu/~ahrweb/
© 2001 by University of Chicago Press
Comparative/World 1329 
trality of the United States to the fate of postwar and 
then post-treaty Japan. The Truman and Eisenhower 
administrations in Washington spoke repeatedly of 
ensuring that Japan remained on the American side in 
the Cold War in northeast Asia. Ambassador Douglas 
MacArthur reported regularly from the embassy in 
Tokyo that the need for the still weak Japan of the 
1950s to trade with the United States would tie the two 
nations together. Given that Japan had lost its prewar 
China market and that other nations, led by Britain, 
were decidedly wary of attempts to encourage any 
major revival of the Japanese economy and worked to 
exclude Tokyo from the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (GATT), it was readily apparent that such 
economic realities ought to have carried the day. 
Yet the highly disruptive security crisis of 1960 
damages this comforting thesis. Despite the thorough 
discussion by Forsberg of the U.S.-Japan trade friction 
experienced in the 1950s, the economic connection 
proved to be of little comfort to American policy 
makers when angry Japanese demonstrators took to 
the streets to protest the very existence both of the 
alliance and of the conservative government of Prime 
Minister Nobusuke Kishi that had loyally supported it. 
Japanese domestic opinion was far from convinced 
that, to employ Forsberg's subtitle, "the Cold War 
context of Japan's postwar economic revival" was the 
way forward. Since the mass student demonstrations in 
Tokyo were aimed at countering precisely what Fors- 
berg charts in the 1950s, it is difficult not to feel that 
more attention might have been placed on the 1960 
crisis. We get a vivid sense of how U.S. trade negoti- 
ators and security analysts saw post-treaty Japan but 
tend to hear less of how divided Japanese society itself 
was during these years. The assumed economic imper- 
atives do not appear to have been quite so obvious, 
precisely because the opposition in Japan sensed that 
trade, finance, and technology from the United States 
served to bind Tokyo ever closer to the American 
imperium. The fact that there would be substantial 
shifts in American dealings with Japan after 1960 
suggests that "lessons" were quickly accepted by Wash- 
ington and that the best way to preserve the alliance 
was to downplay the Cold War factor. 
This book is an ambitious attempt to place postwar 
economic history within the wider realm of interna- 
tional relations. It is a pioneering study of patient 
administrations, angry Congressmen, and pleading 
Japanese bureaucrats. It also includes wry commentary 
on the dismissive U.S. view of Japan's economic 
prospects and reports on the bizarre moment when 
Secretary of State John Foster Dulles followed up his 
complaints on the shoddy quality of a "brightly pat- 
terned flannel shirt of cheap material made in Japan" 
by demonstrating to Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida 
that it had been copied from its superior American 
counterpart. Despite slight reservations over his han- 
dling of the big picture, Forsberg's account of the 
difficulties and successes of U.S. dealings with Japan 
on the economic front in the 1950s remains a substan- 
tial achievement. 
ROGER BUCKLEY 
International Christian University, 
Tokyo 
JUDITH S. JEFFERY. Ambiguous Commitments and Un- 
certain Policies: The Truman Doctrine in Greece, 1947- 
1952. Lanham, Md.: Lexington Books. 2000. Pp. xii, 
342. $65.00. 
The involvement of the United States in the affairs of 
Greece in the late 1940s has attracted scholarly atten- 
tion for decades. A small, underdeveloped European 
country, Greece found itself on the geographical and 
ideological frontline of the Cold War. Its staggering 
political and economic problems, stemming from 
World War II and the civil war that ensued, became 
bound up with American global foreign policy. From 
the early 1950s, when Leften S. Stavrianos wrote of 
Greece as America's "dilemma and opportunity," the 
historiography of this unequal yet close relationship 
has grown significantly. After the United States's Viet- 
nam experience and Greece's difficult years under 
military rule in the late 1960s, accounts critical of 
American intervention in Greece appeared. In her 
introduction to the literature, Judith S. Jeffery briefly 
discusses a couple of the revisionist works, those by 
Lawrence S. Wittner and Yannis R. Roubatis. 
In her own book, Jeffery accepts as given that the 
diplomatic culture of the Cold War significantly af- 
fected U.S.-Greek relations and that there were neg- 
ative consequences of U.S. intervention for Greek 
national sovereignty. Her attention, she notes, is more 
narrowly focused on the aid program created by the 
Truman administration and then continued under the 
Marshall Plan managed by U.S. officials. In this con- 
text, the work takes up the civil war and Greek 
domestic politics that were critical to the course and 
outcome of the aid program. 
The first two chapters of the book set the stage for 
the proclamation of the Truman Doctrine. Then the 
author offers a sampling of opinion in the American 
press regarding aid to Greece before and after Presi- 
dent Harry S. Truman's speech to Congress. There 
follow three chapters on the aid program, including 
both its economic and military components. The ac- 
count continues with a short chapter on the defeat of 
the leftist forces that adds little to existing knowledge 
on the issue. Two chapters take the reader from 1949 
to 1952, covering several related topics, including the 
outlook and actions of American administrators of the 
aid program, Greek domestic politics, the Greek mil- 
itary in politics, the scaling back of economic aid, and 
Greece's admission to the North Atlantic Treaty Or- 
ganization (NATO). The narrative is topped off with 
both a conclusion and an epilogue. The latter is an 
unilluminating sketch of the coming of military rule in 
Greece in 1967 that would have been better left out. A 
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number of appendixes reproduce documents, includ- 
ing Truman's message to the U.S. Congress. 
The work is based largely on official publications of 
the U.S. government, including the "Foreign Relations 
of the United States" series. In addition, Jeffery 
conducted interviews in Greece in the late 1980s and 
utilized manuscript collections found in the Truman 
Library. But there are no sources in Greek, certainly a 
drawback when it comes to discussing and analyzing 
the crucial events that transpired in Greece. 
A main argument of the book is that the Truman 
Doctrine committed the United States unambiguously 
to help Greece with economic and military aid in order 
to bring the civil war that was tearing the country apart 
to a "speedy end" and to rehabilitate the country 
economically. But, in the author's view, the United 
States contradicted its own policy of unwavering com- 
mitment to aid Greece by placing conditions, such as 
the demand for political reform, on the Greek govern- 
ment in return for the proffered aid. This critique is 
repeated in several of the chapters. This argument is 
not tenable, however, because the United States im- 
plemented its bold new policy of containment in as 
specific a manner as might be reasonably expected. In 
Greece, the purpose of the aid was to help the Greek 
government defeat the insurgents. The amount of aid 
to be given was up to the United States government, 
which reserved the right to terminate that commitment 
whenever it saw fit. There was no contradiction in the 
American policy. The United States sought to include 
political reform in order to encourage the Greek state 
to become more efficient and therefore better able to 
deal with the communist threat. 
When it comes to the leftist insurgency, Jeffery 
argues that the outcome of the civil war was not so 
much a victory for U.S. policy but rather a defeat for 
the guerillas in the Democratic Army. Thus the Tru- 
man Doctrine was not a resounding success, as touted 
by the administration in Washington, but a failure. It is 
true that the communists were not defeated merely 
because of American involvement. Other factors, in- 
cluding the leadership and tactics of the Greek Com- 
munist Party (KKE), the withdrawal of Yugoslav sup- 
port for the left, the efforts of the Greek government, 
and public attitudes, played a role. Nevertheless, the 
termination of the civil war was a victory for the 
United States, vindicating its policy in Greece while 
marking a defeat for the communists who in the end 
failed to achieve their goals. 
Finally, the author asserts that U.S. policy failed in 
its intent to help rehabilitate Greece economically 
because aid was cut back beginning in 1950, just as the 
war-ravaged country was starting to get back on its feet 
after a decade of conflict. Direct economic aid was 
reduced because the primary goal of the Truman 
Doctrine was achieved. Greece's inclusion in the Mar- 
shall Plan, however, brought continued economic as- 
sistance. That more might have been done was noted 
at the time. But this does not mean that the promises 
expressed in U.S. policy were inappropriate to the 
actual efforts. In sum, our knowledge and understand- 
ing of the subject is not greatly advanced by this work. 
GERASIMos AUGUSTINOS 
University of South Carolina 
JOHN SUBRITZKY. Confronting Sukarno: British, Ameri- 
can, Australian and New Zealand Diplomacy in the 
Malaysian-Indonesian Confrontation, 1961-5. New 
York: St. Martin's. 2000. Pp. xix, 246. $59.95. 
This important, little book by John Subritzsky exam- 
ines an international crisis in the mid-1960s known as 
Konfrontasi(Confrontation). Put simply, Confrontation 
was a campaign undertaken in Indonesia, inspired by 
President Sukarno, to prevent the incorporation of the 
former British-held territories of Sarawak and Borneo 
into the new Federation of Malaysia. The Indonesian 
dictator set out to crush this newly emerging state 
because he regarded it as part of a British imperialist 
plot to encircle his Southeast Asian archipelago na- 
tion, which occupied a strategic position between the 
Indian and the Pacific Oceans. These territories, 
Sukarno claimed, were rightfully territories of Indone- 
sia, and he refused to acknowledge the validity of the 
succession of legal procedures by the federating states 
(i.e. consultation and the United Nations-observed 
referendum of the inhabitants), at the end of which 
Sarawak and North Borneo (renamed Sabah) became 
states in the Federation. 
Confrontation, which began in earnest in 1963, 
involved Indonesian measures such as terminating 
trade with Singapore, guerilla incursions into Sabah 
and Sarawak, parachute drops and commando raids 
across the Malacca Straits, and various breaks in 
diplomatic relations, plus the confiscation of British 
property. In response, Britain, Australia, and New 
Zealand combined efforts to resist Jakarta, with Lon- 
don in fact assembling a naval armada, as well as 
considerable sections of its North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) air forces. Paradoxically, at no 
stage did the charismatic Sukarno seem eager to 
engage in a full-scale war. 
During the period of Confrontation, Sukarno devel- 
oped close relations with Beijing and Moscow, taking 
delivery of much military equipment, including planes 
and warships from the latter. He also received advisers 
from the Soviet bloc. Given the reigning psychological 
dynamic of the Cold War, these events caused much 
alarm in Washington, leading the United States, 
through the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), to 
intrigue with Indonesian generals to procure the over- 
throw of Sukarno and his policies. Sukarno's power 
finally came to an end when the Communist Party he 
had nurtured was linked to a failed coup attempt in 
1965. His successor, General Suharto, and the army 
quietly ended Confrontation while going about the 
business of ejecting Soviet and Chinese influence as 
well as physically annihilating the powerful Indonesian 
Communist Party (PKI). 
Within this context, then, Subritzky's book attempts, 
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